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The potential of elastic antineutrino-electron scattering in a Gd-doped water Cherenkov detector
to determine the direction of a nuclear reactor antineutrino flux was investigated using the recently
proposed WATCHMAN antineutrino experiment as a baseline model. The expected scattering rate
was determined assuming a 13-km standoff from a 3.758-GWt light water nuclear reactor and the
detector response was modeled using a Geant4-based simulation package. Background was esti-
mated via independent simulations and by scaling published measurements from similar detectors.
Background contributions were estimated for solar neutrinos, misidentified reactor-based inverse
beta decay interactions, cosmogenic radionuclides, water-borne radon, and gamma rays from the
photomultiplier tubes (PMTs), detector walls, and surrounding rock. We show that with the use
of low background PMTs and sufficient fiducialization, water-borne radon and cosmogenic radionu-
clides pose the largest threats to sensitivity. Directional sensitivity was then analyzed as a function
of radon contamination, detector depth, and detector size. The results provide a list of experimental
conditions that, if satisfied in practice, would enable antineutrino directional reconstruction at 3σ
significance in large Gd-doped water Cherenkov detectors with greater than 10-km standoff from a
nuclear reactor.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Near-field (< 100 m) monitoring of nuclear reactors
via measurements of the antineutrino flux and energy
spectrum has been demonstrated using cubic meter scale
liquid scintillator antineutrino detectors such as [1–3].
With such measurements, reactor characteristics such as
the operational status (on/off), relative power output,
and the evolution of the fissionable isotopics in the fuel
(burnup) could be determined. The success of these de-
tectors has spurred research in much larger detectors in
order to increase both sensitivity and standoff distance
[4, 5]. Such detectors could potentially be used as a tool
in the nuclear safeguards regime set forth by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to reduce the effort
needed to conduct physical inspections inside of declared
reactor facilities, to monitor facilities in which inspectors
do not have access, or to either exclude or search for the
presence of clandestine reactors in suspected locations.
Kiloton and megaton scale Gd-doped water Cherenkov
antineutrino detectors (WCDs), such as the recently
proposed WATer CHerenkov Monitor of ANtineutrinos
project (WATCHMAN) [6], are being investigated for
medium to long range (> 10 km) remote monitoring of
nuclear reactors. These detectors utilize the coincident
detection of the positron and neutron from the inverse
beta decay (IBD) interaction (ν¯e + p→ n+ e+) to deter-
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mine both the flux and energies of the incident antineu-
trinos. Water is an attractive option when scaling to
such large detector sizes primarily due to both cost and
environmental factors; and gadolinium is added (typi-
cally 0.1% by weight) to significantly increase both the
neutron-tagging efficiency (∼85%) and capture energy re-
lease (∼8 MeV). In this work, we analyze whether, in ad-
dition to the rate and energy, these detectors can deter-
mine the direction of the incident antineutrinos. Direc-
tional sensitivity might prove crucial in instances where
multiple reactors are located nearby, or if a clandestine
reactor has been confirmed via the IBD signal, direction-
ality could be used in conjunction with other measure-
ments, such as satellite imagery, to determine the loca-
tion of the reactor. Once the location is known, other
methods could be employed to further characterize the
reactor.
Event-by-event reconstruction of the antineutrino di-
rection via IBD in hydrogenous media requires knowl-
edge of the neutron momentum vector within a few re-
coils following its production. This method of directional
reconstruction has not yet been accomplished for reactor
antineutrinos in any medium. In liquid scintillator detec-
tors, CHOOZ [7] has shown that a partial and stochastic
knowledge of the direction of an incoming antineutrino
flux may be gained over time by reconstructing the rel-
ative positions of the positron and neutron thermal cap-
ture interaction vertices from an ensemble of IBD inter-
actions. WCDs, however, presently do not possess the
spatial resolution or sensitivity to do this. In this paper,
we investigate whether an alternative interaction, elastic
electron scattering (ES), can be used to determine the
direction of a reactor antineutrino flux incident upon a
ar
X
iv
:1
51
2.
00
52
7v
3 
 [p
hy
sic
s.i
ns
-d
et]
  1
7 D
ec
 20
16
2WCD. The ES interaction (ν¯e + e
−→ ν¯e + e−) is highly
directional, meaning the electrons are primarily scattered
with a small scattering angle relative to the incident an-
tineutrino. Thus, in principle, the direction of the inci-
dent antineutrino flux can be determined via directional
reconstructions of an ensemble of scattered electrons.
A. Antineutrino-electron scattering
Neglecting the neutrino mass, the elastic antineutrino-
electron scattering cross-section in the laboratory frame
including both the neutral and charged current compo-
nents can be written as
σ(Eν¯e) =
(G2FmeEν¯e
6pi
)[
(1 + 2 sin2 θW )
2 + 12 sin4 θW
]
' (7.8× 10−45)meEν¯e cm2 MeV-2 , (1)
where GF is the Fermi coupling constant [= 1.166364 ×
10-5 GeV-2 (~c)3] and θW is the Weinberg mixing an-
gle (sin2 θW ' 0.23) [8]. Though the ES cross-section
is much smaller than IBD, note that the nuclear reactor
antineutrino flux is concentrated at low energies, where
the interaction cross-section difference is smallest. Wa-
ter also presents five times as many ES targets as IBD
per water molecule (10 e− vs. 2 quasi-free protons) [see
Fig. 1(a)].
From energy and momentum conservation in the labo-
ratory frame, it can be shown that the kinetic energy of
the scattered electron Te, is given by
Te(θ,Eν¯e
)
=
2meE
2
ν¯e cos
2 θ(
me + Eν¯e
)2 − E2ν¯e cos2 θ , (2)
where θ is the angle between the incident antineutrino
and the scattered electron [8]. Using this, the differential
cross-section as a function of the cosine of the scattering
angle can be expressed by
dσ
d cos θ
(
θ,Eν¯e
)
=
4σ0E
2
ν¯eM
2 cos θ
(M2 − E2ν¯e cos2 θ)2
·
[
g21 + g
2
2 ·(
1− 2meEν¯e cos
2 θ
M2 − E2ν¯e cos2 θ
)2
− 2m
2
eg1g2 cos
2 θ
M2 − E2ν¯e cos2 θ
]
, (3)
where σ0 = 88.06 × 10-46 cm2, M = me + Eν¯e , g1 =
1
2
(
gV − gA
)
, and g2 =
1
2
(
gV + gA
)
where gV and gA
are the weak vector and weak axial-vector coupling con-
stants, respectively [8]. The differential cross-section is
plotted in Fig. 1(b) for several incident antineutrino en-
ergies. The trend of the cross-section to increase towards
cos θ = 1 reveals that the scattered electrons are primar-
ily scattered in the direction of the incident antineutri-
nos. Note that the effect becomes more apparent as the
incident antineutrino energy increases.
(a)
(b)
FIG. 1. (a) ES and IBD cross-sections per water molecule as
functions of incident antineutrino energy. Note the 1.8-MeV
energy threshold for IBD. (b) Antineutrino-electron scattering
differential cross-section as a function of the cosine of the
scattering angle θ.
B. Reactor antineutrino energy spectrum
The fission of uranium and plutonium inside of nu-
clear reactor systems produce neutron-rich fission frag-
ment pairs, which beta decay six times on average before
reaching stability. Each one of these decays will pro-
duce an antineutrino with a continuum of possible en-
ergies. Therefore, experiments and simulations are used
to study both the production and subsequent decay of
fission products in critical nuclear reactor systems to un-
derstand the reactor antineutrino energy spectrum. As
shown by [9], the number of antineutrinos produced per
fission per MeV can be modeled for a particular fission-
able isotope by
φ(Eν¯e
)
= exp
( 2∑
i=0
aiE
i
ν¯e
)
, (4)
where the ai parameters are specific to each isotope. Ta-
ble I displays the fitted ai values for the four most dom-
3inant fissioning isotopes (> 99% of all fission) in nuclear
reactors: 235U, 238U, 239Pu, and 241Pu.
Though Eq. (4) and Table I were determined for re-
actor antineutrinos relevant to IBD interactions (> 1.8
MeV), it was assumed that Eq. (4) was valid below this
threshold. Our analysis (Section V) focuses on the high
energy domain where directionality is strongest, therefore
the assumption of extending the reactor spectrum below
the IBD threshold is justified as it will not have any sig-
nificant effects on our results. Furthermore, we neglect
that the electron scattering cross-section has been shown
to be ∼1.5σ larger than predicted by the Standard Model
at very low energies [9, 10].
TABLE I. Parameter values for Eq. (4). The values reported
for 235U, 239Pu, and 241Pu are for thermal neutrons and the
value for 238U is for 0.5 MeV neutrons [9].
Isotope a0 a1 a2
235U 0.870 -0.160 -0.0910
238U 0.976 -0.162 -0.0790
239Pu 0.896 -0.239 -0.0981
241Pu 0.793 -0.080 -0.1085
The isotopic fissioning concentrations in a nuclear re-
actor will depend on the reactor design as well as the level
of fuel burnup. In this work, fission concentrations of a
typical mid-cycle pressurized light water reactor (PWR)
were used (49.6% 235U, 35.1% 239Pu, 8.7% 238U, and
6.6% 241Pu) [11]. The emitted antineutrino energy spec-
tra per fission for each isotope as well as the summation
of the four isotopes weighted by the typical PWR concen-
trations are plotted in Fig. 2 with dashed curves. As was
mentioned before, reactor antineutrinos possess relatively
low energies, with an average energy of about 1.5 MeV.
Folding the incident antineutrino energy spectrum with
the ES cross-section results in the observable/detectable
spectrum shape in a detector. The detectable spectra
per fission of the four isotopes as well as their weighted
sum are plotted in Fig. 2 with solid curves. The average
detectable reactor antineutrino energy is approximately
2.5 MeV.
II. PROPOSED DETECTOR DESIGN
For this work we begin by considering a detector design
based on the recently proposed WATCHMAN project [6]
- a kiloton scale WCD constructed from a large cylindri-
cal stainless steel tank [see Fig. 3(a)]. The diameter and
height of the cylinder are 15.8 m with a total water vol-
ume of about 3.1 kilotons. Photomultipler tubes (PMTs)
are housed in a cylindrical structure 13.8 m in diameter,
separating the detector into two distinct regions. The
outer region serves as a veto for cosmic muons and the in-
ner region as the target. There is approximately 2.1 kilo-
tons of Gd-doped water in the target and 1 kiloton in the
veto. The PMT support structure houses approximately
4300 30.48-cm (12-inch) Hamamatsu PMTs facing the
FIG. 2. Emitted (dashed) and detectable (solid) antineu-
trino energy spectra per fission from fission occurring in 235U,
239Pu, 238U, and 241Pu. The black lines represent the summa-
tion of the four isotopes weighted by the typical fission con-
centrations of a mid-cycle PWR (49.6% 235U, 35.1% 239Pu,
8.7% 238U, and 6.6% 241Pu).
target, with photocathode coverage near 40%, and 480
PMTs facing the veto. Within the target, a cylindrical
fiducial volume (FV) was initially defined with a diame-
ter and height of 10.82 m (∼1 kiloton). The 1.5 m thick
space between the PMT support structure and fiducial
volume acts as a buffer region to enable better reduction
of backgrounds from the PMTs and external radiation.
Like the WATCHMAN detector, the model assumes
a single-core 3.758-GWt light water nuclear reactor lo-
cated 13 km away. To model detector response, a Geant4
[12] based simulation package named Reactor Monitor-
ing Simulation (RMSim) was used. RMSim is a modi-
fied version of WCSim [13], a Geant4-based program for
developing and simulating large WCDs. RMSim con-
tains all relevant physics processes such as particle gen-
eration and transport, Cherenkov physics, optical pho-
ton production and transport, PMT sensitivity, digiti-
zation, and timing. Detailed detector geometry, materi-
als, and optical properties for the WATCHMAN detec-
tor are also included. See Fig. 3(b) for a visualization
of an antineutrino-electron scattering event in the sim-
ulated detector. Event reconstruction was handled by
the fitter software code named BONSAI [14], originally
developed for the Super Kamiokande (Super-K) experi-
ment. We note that at the time of this writing, BONSAI
has not been optimally tuned to the specifications of the
proposed detector in the same way as for Super-K.
Note that the WATCHMAN detector was not origi-
nally designed with ES directional sensitivity in mind.
The design was used here as a baseline model simply be-
cause a detailed Geant4-based simulation already existed.
Therefore, this work considers modifications to certain
features of the detector, namely the size and overburden,
that will greatly improve ES directional sensitivity to the
reactor antineutrino flux.
4(a) (b)
FIG. 3. (a) Basic design of the proposed kiloton WCD [6]. (b)
Visualization of an ES event in the proposed detector modeled
in RMSim. The blue lines represent the Cherenkov light and
the colored dots represent triggered PMTs.
III. SIGNAL
Neglecting oscillations, the reactor-based elastic an-
tineutrino - electron scattering rate in a detector can be
determined using
Rν¯e/e− =
Ne
4piD2
∑
i
fi
∫
φi(Eν¯e)σ(Eν¯e)dEν¯e , (5)
where Ne is the number of available target electrons, D
is the reactor-detector distance (cm), fi is the fission rate
for the particular isotope i (Hz), φi(Eν¯e) is the number of
antineutrinos produced per fission per MeV for isotope i
[see Eq. (4)], and σ(Eν¯e) is the energy dependent scatter-
ing cross-section (cm2) [see Eq. (1)]. The sum runs over
the four dominant fissionable isotopes in nuclear reactors
mentioned in Table I, and the integral runs from 0 to 8
MeV, as in Fig. 2. Carrying out the calculation with the
specifications outlined above results in about 9270 total
scattering events in the kiloton FV over 5 years (not yet
including detector response).
An elastic electron scattering generator was developed
for RMSim to simulate the scattered electrons. The
generator calculates the total number of expected inter-
actions for any desired detector size, acquisition time,
standoff distance, reactor power level, and fission iso-
topics using Eq. (5). It then generates a sample of scat-
tering events by sampling position, energy, and direction
using Eqs. (2-4).
Five years worth of ES events were simulated in RM-
Sim and reconstructed using the BONSAI fitter soft-
ware. The reconstructed cosine of the scattering angles
are shown in Fig. 4(a) with a value of cos θ = 1 denoting
a complete forward scatter of the electron. The recon-
structed distribution appears to follow an exponential-
like distribution peaking at cos θ = 1. RMSim imposes a
triggering threshold of 16 photoelectrons, and it can be
seen from the plot that only 1550 (∼17%) of the original
9270 ES events trigger the detector. Figure 4(b) shows
the detector response of the triggered ES events in terms
of detected photoelectrons. The distribution follows a
decreasing exponential that extends to ∼140 photoelec-
trons. We note that we expect approximately 10 pho-
toelectrons/MeV in the detector at low energies. While
the PMT coverage is similar (40%), this is slightly larger
than the Super-K results of 6 photoelectrons/MeV [15]
because of the higher quantum efficiency of the PMTs
used here.
(a)
(b)
FIG. 4. (a) Reconstruction of the cosine of the scattering
angle distribution for 5 years of reactor ES in the proposed
WCD. (b) Detected photoelectron distribution of the 5-year
triggered signal.
IV. BACKGROUNDS
Due to the low count rates associated with antineutrino
detection, the background levels in the detector must be
kept to a minimum to maintain suitable statistics. Sev-
eral potential sources of background exist for ES includ-
ing cosmogenic radionuclides, high-energy gamma rays
from the steel vessel and the rock surrounding the detec-
tor, solar neutrinos, misidentified IBD events from the
reactor, PMT gamma rays, and water-borne radon. All
were assumed to be distributed isotropically in direction
5(neglecting the obvious anisotropy of solar neutrinos).
Therefore, in a directional cosine plot, the reactor ES
signal should appear as a peak in the forward direction
atop a flat background.
A. Cosmogenic radionuclides
Cosmic muons and the hadronic showers they produce
can interact with the oxygen atoms in the target region
water to create long-lived (> 1 s) radionuclides. If they
beta decay in the inner detector region, the resultant
electrons can trigger the PMTs and mimic the ES signal.
The cosmogenic radionuclide production yields at Super-
K have been estimated using fluka [16]. Recently, mea-
surements of the production yields in Super-K were also
published [17]. Table II shows the theoretical and mea-
sured results for the five isotopes determined to be the
most relevant for reactor antineutrino-electron scatter-
ing due to their long lifetimes and/or high yields. The
theoretical yields were used to determine the production
rates in the case of 15C, 11Be, 8B, and 8Li because nu-
merical values were provided for each isotope (the theo-
retical yields for 8B and 8Li also provide a conservative
estimate over the measured values). In the case of 16N,
the measured yield (the larger of the two) was used in
the production rate calculation.
The production yields of Table II can be converted to
production rates using
Ri = ρYiLµRµ , (6)
where ρ is the density of the target (g cm-3), Yi is the yield
of isotope i (10-7 µ-1 g-1 cm2), Lµ is the average muon
path length in the detector (cm), and Rµ is the muon rate
(Hz). To determine how the radionuclide backgrounds
scale with depth, we began by assuming a water detector
at the Kamioka Liquid scintillator ANtineutrino Detec-
tor (KamLAND) experiment location, which is at the
same depth as Super-K. Given the published showering
and non-showering muon rates at KamLAND (0.037 Hz
and 0.163 Hz, respectively [18]) and the proportion of ra-
dionuclides produced by the showering component at this
depth is 70% [19], we can use the predictions of Table II
for water to estimate the radionuclide production rates
per unit volume at any depth by scaling with the show-
ering and non-showering muon rates. The total muon
rate scaling was obtained from the analytical expression
for the differential muon intensity (cm−2 s−1) in the flat-
earth approximation provided by Mei and Hime:
Iµ(h0) = (67.97e
−h0
0.285 + 2.071e
−h0
0.698 )× 10−6 , (7)
where h0 is the vertical depth (km.w.e.) [20]. Similarly,
we employed their expression for the muon energy spec-
trum for any slant depth (the averaged distance traveled
through rock by muons at an experiment) h (km.w.e.):
dN
dEµ
= Ae−bh(γµ−1)
[
Eµ + µ(1− e−bh)]−γµ , (8)
where A is a normalization constant with respect to the
differential muon intensity at a particular depth, b = 0.4
km.w.e.−1, γµ = 3.77, µ = 693 GeV, and Eµ is the
muon energy in GeV. Once a muon spectrum is gener-
ated for an assumed depth, we can calculate the average
muon energy. Previously published estimates of the mean
muon energy at KamLAND have ranged from 198 GeV
to 285 GeV [20–22]. A depth of 2350 m.w.e. produces
an average muon energy consistent with the midpoint of
the range (240 GeV), and was therefore accepted as our
best estimate of the slant depth of KamLAND. We also
make a simplifying assumption that there is an energy
above which all muons form showers, which we define
as the “showering equivalent energy”. For KamLAND,
where 18% of the muon flux is showering, the “showering
equivalent energy” is 354 GeV. Using the same approach
and by matching the total muon flux reported in [23],
the depth of the Irvine-Michigan-Brookhaven (IMB) de-
tector site (the same site for the proposed WATCHMAN
detector) was estimated to be 1540 m.w.e. This result is
close to the 1570-m.w.e. depth reported by IMB [23].
The outer veto is used to identify and reject spallation
events following muons entering the detector. For this
work, an additional muon veto must be applied to re-
duce cosmogenic radionuclide decays. Following a muon
that traverses the inner FV region, all subsequent events
within 2 m of a showering muon track, or 1 m of a non-
showering muon track are removed for a period of time
dependent upon depth. Veto time adjustments as a func-
tion of depth are described in further detail in Section
V A. The detector live time at each depth was calculated
conservatively assuming that all muons traverse the en-
tire length of the cylindrical FV.
Applying the tubular veto above, the rate of each of
the five major radionuclide components were calculated
as a function of depth. Due to its long lifetime and large
yield, 16N significantly dominates the mix, producing
∼90% of the total. Uncertainties in the vertex recon-
struction, which result in some radionuclide events being
reconstructed outside the tubular veto regions surround-
ing the muon tracks, were also determined via indepen-
dent simulations and included in the calculations.
B. PMT gamma rays
The PMT glass will contain trace amounts of natural
U, Th, and K. The decays of 208Tl (from the Th de-
cay chain) and 40K will produce 2.6-MeV and 1.4-MeV
gamma rays, respectively. Most of these will interact
outside the FV, but due to the uncertainty in the event
reconstruction, some events will be reconstructed inside,
contributing to the background. An arbitrary number
of PMT gamma rays were simulated in RMSim and the
black curve (right diagonal shading) in Fig. 5 shows the
distance from the reconstructed interaction vertex to the
nearest PMT for each event. From the figure, it is clear
that a significant number of events are reconstructed in-
6TABLE II. Cosmogenic radionuclide production yields in water calculated by [16] and measured by [17] for the Super-K detector.
Only the isotopes determined to be relevant to reactor antineutrino-electron scattering are considered.
Isotope
Half-life
(s)
Decay
Mode
Theoretical Yield
(10−7µ−1g−1cm2)
Measured Yield
(10−7µ−1g−1cm2)
Primary Process
(on 16O)
16N 7.13 β−γ (66%), β− (34%) 18 23.4 ± 1.9 ± 1.7 (n, p)
15C 2.45 β−γ (63%), β− (37%) 0.8 <3.9 (n, 2p)
11Be 13.8 β− (55%), β−γ (45%) 0.8 <10.0 (n, α+ 2p)
8B 0.77 β+ 5.8
4.9 ± 0.2 ± 0.2 (pi
+, α+ 2p+ 2n)
8Li 0.84 β− 13 (pi−, α + 2H + p+ n)
side the FV (> 150 cm away from the PMTs), forming
two distinct groups. Near the PMTs, the black curve
appears to follow an exponential, whereas further away
from the PMTs an almost flat distribution is observed.
To improve upon the results, we attempt to remove the
poorly fit events. By applying a cut to the log likelihood
fit parameter (≥ 25) and the number of triggered PMTs
(≥ 25), roughly half of the events are removed, leaving
an exponential distribution with respect to the distance
to the PMTs (shown in blue and left diagonal shading in
Fig. 5).
FIG. 5. PMT-based background events as a function of the
distance from the reconstructed vertex to the nearest PMT
(black and right diagonal shading). The blue curve (left diag-
onal shading), which requires both the triggered PMT count
(nPMTs) and the log likelihood (Loglike) to be ≥ 25, follows
an exponential distribution.
The exponential behavior of the blue curve (left di-
agonal shading) in Fig. 5 is a promising result, if re-
alizable in practice. It implies that the PMT gamma
ray background can be reduced to a subdominant level
with a large enough buffer region. To reduce the PMT
gamma ray backgrounds with a fixed detector size how-
ever, the FV must be decreased to allow for a sufficient
buffer thickness. This will result in a significant reduc-
tion in the number of detectable ES interactions. Assum-
ing an exponential distribution with respect to distance
from the PMTs, the PMT gamma ray background can
be estimated for any sized FV using the assumed im-
purity levels of Th and 40K in the glass. In this work,
the PMTs are assumed to have similar radioactivity lev-
els as the low-background 25.4-cm (10-inch) Hamamatsu
PMTs employed at the Double CHOOZ detector with
Th and 40K impurity concentrations of 0.03 ppm and 20
ppm, respectively [24].
C. Water-borne 222Rn/214Bi
The beta decay of 214B (a daughter product of the 238U
decay chain product 222Rn, Q = 3.3 MeV) in the target
region will also contribute a significant amount of back-
ground to the ES signal. The presence of 222Rn/214Bi in
the water can occur due to a variety of processes. Some
may result due to trace amounts of naturally occurring
238U present in the water, dissolved 222Rn that has mi-
grated out of the PMT glass, and from radon gas entering
the detector from the mine air. The Sudbury Neutrino
Observatory (SNO) heavy water neutrino detector has
reported an inner detector radon contamination of 10-14
gU/gD2O, assuming the U is in secular equilibrium with
222Rn [25]. Assuming this level of contamination in the
proposed light water detector results in about about 104
214Bi decays per day somewhere in the 1000-m3 FV, of
which approximately 20% survive the Geant4 detector
simulation trigger condition (16 photoelectrons).
Actual radon levels achievable in a real detector will
rely on the water recirculation methods employed, as well
as the radon concentration in the mine air, both of which
could be significantly different than SNO. The SNO de-
tector also employs an acrylic barrier between the heavy
water target and the light water buffer. The acrylic, while
it impedes the migration of radon from the PMTs to the
target, might also be a mild source of radon. One might
envision a different water flow scheme, in which radon
free fresh water is injected inside the target and directed
outward via positive pressure, could achieve reductions
in radon contamination relative to SNO. In this work,
since it is difficult to predict physically achievable radon
concentrations, we simply assume similar concentrations
to SNO as well as hypothetical situations in which the
radon contamination can be reduced further.
D. Other backgrounds
The backgrounds due to gamma rays from the detec-
tor steel vessel and the surrounding rock were determined
7using a study performed by the Isotope Decay At Rest
(IsoDAR) collaboration on the KamLAND detector [26].
IsoDAR assumed a 5-m sphere FV at KamLAND, thus
the results from [26] were scaled to account for the much
larger cylindrical FV of the proposed detector (1000 m3).
Specifically, the estimates were scaled using the difference
in the fiducial surface areas. This method assumes the
proposed detector steel vessel will have similar cleanliness
levels as KamLAND and the surrounding rock will be of
similar composition to the KamLAND mine. The dif-
ferences in densities and gamma attenuation lengths be-
tween the scintillator used in KamLAND and the water
used in the detector under study, as well as the differences
in gamma path lengths for the spherical and cylindrical
geometries were neglected. All gamma rays that reached
the FV were assumed to interact.
The 8B solar neutrino background was also determined
by scaling from [26]. Assuming the neutrino flux is con-
stant with depth, the interaction rate is dependent solely
on the number of available targets, which is proportional
to the fiducial mass. Therefore the solar neutrino back-
ground estimation in [26] was scaled according to the
difference in the the KamLAND fiducial mass (0.408 kilo-
tons) and the proposed detector fiducial mass (1 kiloton).
The scaled steel, rock, and solar neutrino results from
[26] were corrected for the difference in detector live time
between KamLAND (56.2%) and the model at any depth.
Corrections were also included to account for the 3-MeV
visible energy threshold used in [26].
If the neutron from a reactor-based IBD event is not
detected within the time or spatial coincidence require-
ments, or it is simply not captured, then the lone positron
signal will mimic ES. These misidentified IBD back-
grounds were estimated assuming an IBD interaction rate
of 20 events per day and a 20% missed neutron rate as
in [6].
V. ANALYSIS
As mentioned in Section IV, background events are as-
sumed to be isotropic in direction. Reconstructed ES
signal events exhibit an exponential behavior towards
cos θ = 1. Therefore, in a plot of the cosine of the scat-
tering angle, we expect the total signal to follow the be-
havior of a constant plus an exponential curve as in
y = A+BeCx, (9)
where A, B, and C are free parameters in the fit to
the data. To determine the statistical significance of the
ES signal, an arbitrarily large independent sample of ES
events was simulated to determine the exponential slope
parameter C. With the slope parameter fixed, the un-
certainty in the exponential normalization parameter B
was used to determine the uncertainty and statistical sig-
nificance of the signal. This analysis method would only
be possible in practice if the exponential slope could be
obtained a priori using directional calibrations, such as
the electron accelerator at Super-K [27].
Figure 6 displays the detector response (photoelectron
production) from all sources of background except PMTs,
as well as the ES signal for a time period of one year in a
3-kiloton water detector at the depth of the KamLAND
detector (2350 m.w.e.). PMT backgrounds were not in-
cluded because the rate normalization, which ranges from
dominant to minor, depends entirely on the arbitrary
fiducial volume chosen. From the plot it is clear that
222Rn/214Bi dominates the total number of backgrounds,
particularly at low energies. At higher energies and shal-
lower depths, radionuclides begin to dominate.
FIG. 6. The most significant backgrounds expected in a kilo-
ton FV WATCHMAN-like detector over a one-year data ac-
quisition period together with the ES signal at the same depth
as KamLAND (2350 m.w.e.). Water-borne 222Rn/214Bi and
cosmogenic radionuclides represent the most important back-
ground types shown here. Note, sufficient distance between
the PMTs and the fiducial volume was assumed to reduce
PMT backgrounds to a subdominant level. In the following,
we investigate the sensitivity of our model to many of these
backgrounds as a function of energy, depth, and fiducial vol-
ume.
Based on the spectral shapes shown in Fig. 6, it is
worth investigating if detector sensitivity has some de-
pendence on the amount of detected energy. First, note
that the ES shape extends to higher energies than the
radon background. The radionuclide background, how-
ever, begins to dominate at high energy. Therefore, in
the following section, detector sensitivities are presented
for small slices in energy (25→ 65 and 60→ 90 triggered
PMTs) and at different depths. At higher energies, the
PMT based backgrounds are both lower in number and
more accurately reconstructed, and thus larger FVs can
be used. For the radon, it is clear that a significant im-
provement in contamination (relative to the SNO levels)
would need to be made before ES directionality might be
achievable. We cannot comment on whether a dedicated
R&D campaign or a new scheme of optimized water flow
might be able to achieve significant improvements. Here
we simply calculate the sensitivities that would result if
significant reductions were achieved.
8A. Sensitivity vs. depth
We now investigate the overall behavior of the direc-
tional sensitivity as a function of depth using the shower-
ing and non-showering muon rate scalings with depth de-
termined with the methods described in Section IV A. For
the purpose of this work, we only consider depths from
1500 to 3000 m.w.e. The showering and non-showering
scaling factors (relative to the KamLAND depth) are
shown in Fig. 7(a).
Using the muon scalings, the radionuclide background
and detector live time were determined as a function of
depth. Because the muon rate decreases significantly
with depth, the position sensitive veto time can be in-
creased to remove more radionuclide background without
suffering any live time losses. Therefore, the tubular veto
time was increased with depth to maintain a live time ap-
proximately equal to the KamLAND live time (56%). A
maximum veto time of 20 s was arbitrarily imposed since
the radionuclides will migrate outside of the tubular veto
if given enough time. Figure 7(b) displays the veto times
and detector live times as a function of depth used in
subsequent calculations. A veto time of 20 s is reached
at 1900 m.w.e. and remains fixed at deeper depths.
The average statistical significances as a function of
depth and radon contamination relative to SNO were
then determined. The results are shown in Fig. 8
for radon levels of 1 × SNO [Fig. 8(a)], 10-2 × SNO
[Fig. 8(b)], and 10-4 × SNO [Fig. 8(c)]. As an exam-
ple, Appendix A displays a detailed breakdown of the
expected number of elastic scattering signal and back-
ground events in the two different energy ranges for a
kiloton sized WATCHMAN-like detector at the same
depth as KamLAND (2350 m.w.e.). Repeated multi-
ple independent data samples were used to calculate the
mean significance per 5-year experiment. Error bars are
included in Fig. 8(a)-(c) and represent the uncertainty in
the mean of the many independent 5-year experiments,
however are too small to be observed here. Note, the re-
sults of a single experiment will produce sensitivity val-
ues distributed around the mean with an uncertainty of
approximately 1σ. With no reduction in radon (relative
to SNO), directionality does not seem to be possible at
any depth with a kiloton sized detector. If the radon
contamination is significantly reduced (by four orders of
magnitude), the 25 → 65 slice produces the most signifi-
cant signal. This is clearly observed in Fig. 8(c), where a
3σ significance can be obtained using this slice starting
at about 1900 m.w.e.
The total detector size (including the fiducial, buffer,
and veto) required to obtain a significant (3σ) signal was
also considered for the three radon levels in Fig. 8(a)-(c).
This was done assuming both the signal and background
scale linearly with the FV, while significance scales with
the signal (S) to background (B) ratio (S/
√
B). The
respective buffer and veto thicknesses for each energy
range were then added to determine the total detector
size. The results are shown in Fig. 8(d)-(f) for all three
(a)
(b)
FIG. 7. (a) Showering and non-showering muon rates as a
function of depth (relative to KamLAND) determined from
[20]. (b) Veto times used in the position sensitive veto system
as a function of depth and the resultant detector live times.
The veto time was varied as a function of depth in order to
retain a constant live time up to a maximum veto time of 20
s, which was reached at 1900 m.w.e.
radon levels. Error bars are included and represent the
uncertainties in Fig. 8(a)-(c) propagated through the cal-
culation. However, once again, the error bars represent
the uncertainty in the mean and do not represent the
uncertainty of a single experiment.
If in fact radon levels cannot be reduced relative to
SNO, the detector size needs to be increased significantly
(> 50 kilotons) in order for directionality to be possi-
ble. If significant radon reduction is possible, detector
sizes anywhere from 3 kilotons (WATCHMAN-size) to
10 kilotons may be directionally sensitive, depending on
the specific depth and radon levels.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Our study shows that under certain conditions, the re-
construction of the direction of a reactor may be achiev-
able via the antineutrino-electron scattering channel.
The main factors affecting sensitivity are radon contami-
nation and overburden. With similar water-borne radon
9(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
FIG. 8. Average statistical significance in a 3-kiloton detector (total mass) plotted as a function of depth using two different
energy ranges considered here (25 to 65 and 60 to 90 hit PMTs), with radon levels of 1 × SNO (a), 10-2 × SNO (b), and 10-4
× SNO (c). Error bars are included and represent the uncertainty in the mean (however they are too small to be seen in most
cases). The uncertainty in a single experiment is ±1σ. Total detector size required for 3σ significance plotted as a function of
depth for radon levels of 1 × SNO (d), 10-2 × SNO (e), and 10-4 × SNO (f). Again, error bars represent the uncertainty in
the mean and do not represent the uncertainty in a single experiment. Therefore the results should only be used as a guide.
levels to SNO and a 3000-m.w.e. depth, a fairly large
detector approximately the size of Super-K (55-kiloton
total, 37-kiloton fiducial) is required for 3σ sensitivity
to the assumed 3.758-GWt reactor at 13-km standoff.
With a factor of 100 radon reduction and at least 2000-
m.w.e. depth, a more tractable 6.3-kiloton (885-ton fidu-
cial) detector is sufficient for the same reactor power
and significance level (see Appendix B for an example
of a directional plot with these conditions). If a signif-
icant reduction in radon is possible (10-4 × SNO), a 4-
kiloton (172-ton fiducial) detector at a shallower 1500-
m.w.e. depth (similar to WATCHMAN) would be direc-
tionally sensitive for the same reactor power and signif-
icance level. Assumptions in these results include simi-
lar steel cleanliness levels to the KamLAND detector, a
continuously operated reactor at full power with no shut-
down periods, and constant fission fractions typical of a
mid-cycle PWR. Furthermore, the situation investigated
here is the directional sensitivity of an incoming antineu-
trino flux with respect to an assumed reactor location. If
the true location is unknown, a statistical penalty would
need to be applied for testing in multiple directions.
More generally, flux scaling allows us to approximate
directional sensitivity at greater distances and for smaller
reactor power levels. Assuming the case of 10-2 × SNO
radon contamination and 2500-m.w.e. overburden, direc-
tional reconstruction of a 3.758-GWt reactor at 3σ sig-
nificance would be possible at a 70-km standoff with a
1-megaton (757-kiloton fiducial) detector. Equivalently,
a megaton detector would be sensitive to a 125-MWt re-
actor at 13 km. If the radon contamination is reduced by
104, the 3.758-GWt reactor standoff increases to 105 km
while the smallest detectable reactor at 13 km decreases
to 55 MWt. Megaton-sized water-based detectors rep-
resent the outer limit of what is possible in field-able
neutrino detectors [28].
While these conditions may be difficult to achieve in
practice, we have demonstrated that Gd-doped WCDs
have the potential to utilize elastic electron scattering
for nuclear reactor antineutrino directionality. Compared
with the WATCHMAN detector, the main factors for im-
provement in directional pointing are greater depth and
10-2 or less radon contamination in the inner detector vol-
ume compared with the SNO detector. We hope that this
research may serve as a catalyst to pursue an R&D ef-
fort into water-borne radon removal techniques for future
large scale Gd-doped WCDs used for remote monitoring
of nuclear reactors.
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TABLE III. Signal and background estimates for a WATCHMAN-like detector at a depth of 2350 m.w.e for 5 years assuming
two different energy analysis cuts. Average significances were calculated assuming the radon levels relative to those of SNO.
The radionuclide background is denoted by “RN” and the backgrounds due to steel, rock, misidentified IBD, and solar neutrinos
are combined together and denoted by “Other”. Since the ideal FV can change with increasing energy, we include the range of
FVs used within each energy slice.
5 Year Acquisition
PMT
Triggers
FV
(m3)
ES
Exp.
Slope
RN PMTs Other
Radon (× SNO)
1 10-2 10-4
25 → 65 187 97 4.6 Bkgd. Components 123 1463 511 1148920 11489 115
Total Background 1151017 13586 2212
Significance 0.1σ 1.5σ 3.5σ
60 → 90 500 - 1000 51 6.7 Bkgd. Components 722 270 1278 61485 615 6
Total Background 63755 2885 2276
Significance 0.5σ 2.0σ 2.2σ
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APPENDIX A. EXAMPLE: SIGNAL AND
BACKGROUND ESTIMATES AT KAMIOKA
DEPTH
Table III shows the predicted number of reactor-
induced elastic scattering events 13 km from a 3.758-
GWt power reactor, and the expected number of back-
ground events after 5 years in a WATCHMAN-like detec-
tor at the same depth as the KamLAND detector (2350
m.w.e.). “WATCHMAN-like” refers to a 0.1% Gd-doped
water Cherenkov detector with a total detector volume
of just over 3 kilotons, a 2-kiloton inner detector volume
and a nominal 1-kiloton fiducial volume. The actual fidu-
cial volume depends on the energy cuts used. The two
energy regimes used here extend from 25 to 65 triggered
PMTs and from 60 to 90 triggered PMTs. The table also
includes the fixed exponential slope used in Eq. (9) and
the average statistical significance for the three different
assumed radon contaminations relative to the SNO de-
tector.
APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE: DIRECTIONAL
SIGNAL AND BACKGROUND PLOT
Figure 9 shows an example 5-year directional recon-
struction of all signal and background events that trigger
between 25 and 65 PMTs in a 6.3-kiloton (885-ton fidu-
cial) detector at a depth of 2000 m.w.e. with radon con-
tamination reduced by a factor of 100 relative to SNO.
These conditions represent a more tractable experimen-
tal design option to achieve a 3σ directional signal with
respect to an assumed known direction.
FIG. 9. (Color online) Cosine of the reconstructed angle for
all low-energy (25 to 65 triggered PMTs) events in 5 years
for a 6.3-kiloton (885-ton fiducial) detector at a depth of 2000
m.w.e. with a radon level of 10−2 × SNO. The exponential
fit shown in blue has a fixed slope of 4.6 as in Table III. The
directional significance of the antineutrino source at cos θ = 1
from this particular data is 3.1σ.
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